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MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS: IRREPARABLE
INJURY TO THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT?
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court recently embarked on a path toward removing the only
teeth the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has—its procedural
mandates. In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and, more
recently, in the controversial case Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the
Court declined to issue an injunction against federal agency action despite the
agency’s failure to complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
regarding the action, as required by NEPA. The Court reasoned that
environmental plaintiffs must show a “likelihood” of environmental harm to
meet the irreparable-injury requirement of injunctive relief. Additionally, the
Court held that an agency’s failure to complete an EIS, with nothing more,
does not establish a likelihood of environmental harm. By declining to issue an
injunction, the Court failed to ensure that an EIS would be completed before
the federal agency reached a decision or foreclosed less harmful alternatives.
Because of Winter’s and Geertson’s unique facts, the holdings of these
cases can be limited. That is, these cases should not be interpreted to espouse
the typical approach to a NEPA case. This Comment explains how Winter and
Geertson can be interpreted narrowly to harmonize with the well-established
precedents of Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo and Amoco Production Co. v.
Village of Gambell, which urge that the purpose of the relevant statute be
considered when deciding whether to issue an injunction. The purpose of
NEPA—facilitating informed agency decision making—can be effectuated only
through the Act’s procedural mandates because the Act has no substantive
mandates. Therefore, irreparable injury should be presumed when an agency
has violated the Act’s procedural requirements. A showing of environmental
harm should be unnecessary. Ultimately, this presumption would put
environmental plaintiffs on equal footing with defendants and force agencies to
take their obligations under NEPA seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
As one of the first major congressional environmental laws, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) represents a historical and
fundamental shift in how United States policy makers conceptualize the federal
government’s relationship with the natural environment.2 Using sweeping
language, NEPA announces its lofty goals “to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.”3 But in the recent and controversial4 decision of Monsanto Co. v.

1 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010)).
2 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 229 (5th ed.
2007).
3 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
4 See Andrew Pollack, U.S. Approves Genetically Modified Alfalfa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at B1;
Paul Voosen, USDA’s Alfalfa Decision Postpones Reckoning on Biotech Crops, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/28/28greenwire-usdas-alfalfa-decision-postpones-reckoning-on-69
218.html?pagewanted=all.
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Geertson Seed Farms, the Supreme Court ignored NEPA’s purpose by
declining to issue an injunction against an agency in violation of the Act.5 As a
result, the Court may have significantly weakened the force of NEPA.
Before the enactment of NEPA, the environmental effects of federal agency
actions went unrecognized, at least formally.6 Now, NEPA commands
agencies to consider the potential environmental effects of the vast majority of
their decisions.7 The importance of this requirement is suggested by its status
as NEPA’s sole mandate.
Unlike most legislation, NEPA contains no substantive requirements, such
as emission limits on a particular pollutant. Rather, it ensures that agencies
follow certain procedures before moving forward with major decisions.8
Specifically, NEPA requires agencies to prepare formal Environmental Impact
Statements (EISs) for proposed actions.9 Only after doing so may an agency
decide whether to implement the particular action in question.10
Although NEPA was passed with lofty goals in mind, the Act’s lack of
substantive requirements means that agencies have some discretion in deciding
how much weight to give to the findings uncovered by their EISs.11 Indeed,
after the completion of an EIS, an agency only has to “[s]tate what [its]
decision was,” “[i]dentify all alternatives considered by the agency in reaching
its decision,” “identify and discuss all such factors including any essential
considerations of national policy which were balanced by the agency in
making its decision and state how those considerations entered into its
decision,” and “[s]tate whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize
environmental harm from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if
not, why they were not.”12 An agency is not required to abandon a proposed
action if the agency’s EIS reveals the potential for environmental harm.13
5

130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010).
See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 229.
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(b) (2011) (“No decision on the proposed action shall be made or recorded . . . by
a Federal agency until the later of the following dates: (1) Ninety (90) days after publication of the
notice . . . for a draft environmental impact statement. (2) Thirty (30) days after publication of the
notice . . . for a final environmental impact statement.”).
11 See id. § 1505.2(a)–(c).
12 Id.
13 See id. However, if an EIS uncovers a potential violation of another substantive environmental statute,
an agency may have to alter its proposed course of action.
6
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Despite NEPA’s lack of substantive requirements, Congress envisioned the
Act as a powerful piece of legislation, the procedural requirements of which
were meant to be taken seriously.14 NEPA has proven that it is indeed
powerful. Environmental plaintiffs suing for NEPA violations enjoy a success
rate of about 44% in district courts and about 32% in circuit courts.15 The Act
has been successfully invoked at least 237 times between 2005 and 2009 alone
to require agencies to more thoroughly assess the environmental impacts of a
proposed action.16
Because NEPA consists only of procedural requirements that force
agencies to consider the environmental implications of their actions, it follows
that these procedures must be completed before an agency decides to embark
on a specific course of action. If not, NEPA would become a nullity. A simple
example serves to illustrate why. Imagine that the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) approves construction of a major highway, a small
portion of which would pass through a vast forest. FHWA then begins its EIS
after hiring contractors for the job and consulting with engineers, but before
the forest has been touched. FHWA later discovers, through creating its EIS,
that the forest is an unadulterated and biologically diverse ecosystem. What
should FHWA do now that it already has spent money, time, and other
resources on planning this project? Similarly, imagine that an environmental
group challenged FHWA’s premature approval of the project. Should the
reviewing court issue an injunction barring further planning or work on the
project until the EIS is completed to prevent the type of problem described
above?
The Supreme Court addressed issues similar to these in two recent
decisions. This Comment analyzes the Court’s trend of becoming less willing
to issue injunctions when a violation of NEPA has occurred. This Comment
argues that, by allowing an agency to reach, and sometimes even act on, its
decision before completion of an EIS, the Court is decreasing NEPA’s
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (stating that the procedural requirements of NEPA must be completed “to the
fullest extent possible”).
15 JAY E. AUSTIN ET AL., ENVTL. LAW INST., JUDGING NEPA: A “HARD LOOK” AT JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 8–9 (2004), available at http://www.
endangeredlaws.org/pdf/JudgingNEPA.pdf.
16 See NEPA Litigation, NAT’L ENVTL. POL’Y ACT, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/legal_corner/litigation.html
(follow the 2001 through 2009 “Litigation Survey” hyperlinks) (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). This figure is the
result of adding all instances when a court held that an agency’s categorical exclusion, Environmental
Assessment (EA), or EIS was inadequate; compliance with NEPA was required; or a supplemental EIS was
needed. See id.
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effectiveness and undermining its important purpose of ensuring informed
agency decision making. By essentially changing the timeline along which an
agency may complete an EIS, the Court may be removing the only teeth that
NEPA possesses—its procedural mandates.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of NEPA, including the
procedures agencies must follow under the Act. It shows that NEPA is a dead
letter when agencies are allowed to reach or act on their decisions before
completing EISs. Part I then concludes with an explanation of the standard that
courts employ to review an agency’s compliance with NEPA and argues that
relief provided by courts is the most important NEPA enforcement mechanism.
Part II discusses Supreme Court cases regarding the issuance of injunctions
for violations of other environmental statutes. This Part then presents how
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court decide whether to issue injunctions
for NEPA violations. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms highlight the trend toward refusing to issue an injunction for the time
period during which an agency corrects its NEPA violation. In both cases, the
Court required environmental plaintiffs to show a likelihood of environmental
harm to meet the irreparable-injury requirement of injunctive relief.
Part III explains how the holdings of Winter and Geertson can be limited to
their unique facts. Because of these unique facts, the approach federal courts
should take when confronted with a more typical NEPA case remains unclear.
Part III clarifies what the framework for this type of case should be by
attempting to harmonize Winter and Geertson with the Court’s wellestablished precedent in this area of law. Specifically, this Comment argues
that a showing of likely environmental harm is superfluous and proposes that
irreparable harm be presumed when an agency violates NEPA’s procedures.
This presumption of irreparable harm necessarily would lead to injunctive
relief being granted more readily. Injunctions force agencies to consider the
environmental impacts of proposed actions before devoting time, money, or
other resources to implementing a desired plan and before more
environmentally benign alternatives are foreclosed. Therefore, the issuance of
more injunctions would ensure that EISs are completed along the proper
timeline.
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I. OVERVIEW OF NEPA AND ITS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Part provides a brief overview of NEPA and demonstrates that NEPA
is a dead letter when agencies are allowed to reach or act on their decisions
before completing EISs. This Part also explains the standard that courts
employ to review an agency’s compliance with NEPA and argues that relief
provided by courts is the most important NEPA enforcement mechanism.
A. NEPA and Its Goals, Effectuated Through Its Procedures
One of the goals of NEPA is “[t]o declare a national policy” regarding the
environment.17 Scholars have even called it an “environmental Magna
Carta.”18 Congress enacted NEPA to “encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.”19
Congress intended NEPA to establish “action-forcing” procedures20 and
exert significant influence on agencies’ decisions21 despite its lack of
substantive requirements. Otherwise, according to Senator Jackson, who
proposed the enactment of NEPA,22 the Act’s “lofty declarations are nothing
more than that.”23 Senator Jackson also stated that the Act provides
“approaches to dealing with environmental problems on a preventive and an
anticipatory basis.”24 He went on to lament Congress’s history of dealing with
environmental problems through remedial efforts only.25 Senator Jackson
17

42 U.S.C. § 4321.
See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 229.
19 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
20 See 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21 See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 11 (1997) (“Congress envisioned
that federal agencies would use NEPA as a planning tool to integrate the environmental, social, and economic
concerns directly into projects and programs.”).
22 115 CONG. REC. 40,415 (1969) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson).
23 National Environmental Policy: Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the S. Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 116 (1969) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Interior & Insular Affairs).
24 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson).
25 See id. (“As Members of the Senate are aware, too much of our past history of dealing with
environmental problems has been focused on efforts to deal with ‘crises,’ and to ‘reclaim’ our resources from
past abuses.”).
18
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clearly recognized the importance of agencies examining the potential
environmental effects of their decisions before taking action.
Congress intended that NEPA’s underlying goals be effectuated through
the Act’s procedural requirements.26 NEPA requires an impact statement for
“proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”27 While NEPA does not offer
any guidance for interpreting this vague statement, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) has promulgated regulations that shed some
light on its meaning.28 The CEQ defines “[m]ajor Federal action[s]” as
“actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to
Federal control and responsibility.”29 These actions tend to be either the
adoption of “official policy,” “formal plans,” or “programs,” or the “[a]pproval
of specific projects.”30 The CEQ additionally states that the term
“[s]ignificantly,” “as used in NEPA[,] requires considerations of both context
and intensity,” such as the unique conditions of the project’s location and
whether the project is controversial.31 Finally, the CEQ defines “[h]uman
environment” as “the natural and physical environment and the relationship of
people with that environment.”32 As indicated by these definitions, NEPA
applies to an extremely broad range of agency actions.
In determining whether an impact statement is required, an agency first
must assess whether the proposed action in question is categorically excluded
from NEPA.33 “Categorical exclusions” include federal actions that are not
expected to have significant environmental effects.34 For example, the Ninth
Circuit held that the National Park Service did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously when it determined that the effects of a decision to prohibit bikers
from accessing certain trails in a national park, including the resultant
crowding of cyclists onto fewer trails, were not environmental effects

26

See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
28 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508 (2011). The CEQ was granted authority to promulgate such regulations by an
Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 25, 1977). Courts defer to the CEQ’s
interpretation of NEPA. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (holding that CEQ
interpretations of NEPA are “entitled to substantial deference”).
29 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18.
30 Id. § 1508.18(b).
31 See id. § 1508.27(b).
32 Id. § 1508.14.
33 See id. § 1508.4.
34 See id.
27
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triggering NEPA.35 For actions not categorically excluded, an agency must
prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA).36 An EA presents “sufficient
evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental
impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.”37 A Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI) from an EA means the agency has no further
obligations under NEPA and, accordingly, does not need to prepare an EIS.38
The heart of NEPA, section 102, is invoked if an agency determines that an
EIS is necessary.39 An EIS is “a detailed statement” disclosing “the
environmental impact of the proposed action” and “adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented.”40 In
accordance with NEPA’s lofty goals and wide-ranging application, courts have
interpreted the term “effects” quite broadly. For example, impacts on an urban
environment constitute effects under section 102.41 In addition, consequences
of an action that occur “later in time or farther removed in distance” still
warrant consideration.42 Even more striking, the CEQ has defined “effects” as
“ecological . . . , aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health,
whether direct, indirect, or cumulative.”43 “Effects” also includes “those
resulting from actions which may have both beneficial and detrimental effects,
even if on balance the agency believes that the effect will be beneficial.”44
Agencies also examine their proposed actions’ implications for environmental
justice in accordance with an executive order.45

35

Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445 app. at 1457 (9th Cir. 1996).
40 C.F.R. § 1501.3. An agency can skip this step by simply deciding to go ahead with a full-fledged
EIS. Id. § 1501.3(a).
37 Id. § 1508.9(a)(1). “[T]he Federal agency shall . . . [b]ased on the environmental assessment make its
determination whether to prepare an environmental impact statement.” Id. § 1501.4(c).
38 See id. § 1508.13.
39 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
40 See id.
41 See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The Act must be construed to include
protection of the quality of life for city residents.”); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp.
877, 879 (D. Or. 1971) (holding that the Department of Housing and Urban Development must examine the
cumulative effects of the development of an apartment building, including the potential loss of an “existing
view from certain neighboring properties”).
42 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8; accord City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 674–77 (9th Cir. 1975).
43 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8.
44 Id.
45 See EPA, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA’S
NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (1998) (noting that Executive Order 12,898 calls on agencies to work toward
environmental justice and explaining that certain mandates of the Executive Order are directed at NEPArelated activities). The EPA defines “environmental justice” as “[t]he fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development,
36

GWYN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

3/20/2012 9:56 AM

MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS

357

In addition to evaluating the environmental impact and effects of the
desired action, an EIS must propose alternative actions.46 For example, an EIS
must discuss the option of taking no action at all, as well as “[o]ther reasonable
courses of action.”47 Finally, an EIS must also include a description of “the
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity” and “any irreversible
and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.”48 All of section 102’s requirements
ensure that the scope of an EIS is quite wide.
NEPA also provides the opportunity for public input on a proposed agency
decision.49 The agency must provide notice of hearings and meetings and make
environmental documents available to persons who may be interested or
affected.50 In many cases, these stakeholders’ participation has proven
influential in guiding an agency’s ultimate decision.51 The public’s comments,
along with the EIS and any related documents, eventually are made available
to the public at large.52
Notably, the CEQ devotes an entire section of its NEPA regulations to the
timing of an EIS.53 The regulations emphasize that an EIS “shall be prepared
early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the
decision-making process.”54 The regulations also bar an agency from taking
any preliminary action which would “[h]ave an adverse environmental impact”
or “[l]imit the choice of reasonable alternatives” until the completion of an
EIS.55 This makes sense given that Congress intended NEPA to impact agency

implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.” Id. § 1.1.1 (internal
quotation mark omitted).
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (2006).
47 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(b).
48 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iv)–(v).
49 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6.
50 See id. § 1506.6(b).
51 ENVTL. LAW INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT 6 (2010) (“[I]n numerous cases, portions of or entire NEPA alternatives proposed by
individuals, municipalities, tribes, organizations and others have been selected by federal agencies as a result
of the NEPA review.”).
52 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(f). These documents are made available pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
53 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5.
54 Id.
55 See id. § 1506.1(a); see also id. § 1506.1(c)(3) (stating that an agency may take an interim action only
when it “will not prejudice the ultimate decision on the program”). Similarly, in another section of the
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decisions.56 The only way for an EIS to have actual influence is if an agency
completes the EIS before making a decision that potentially affects the
environment and, in making that decision, gives careful consideration to the
findings uncovered by the EIS.57 That is, to achieve the purpose of NEPA—
ensuring informed agency decision making—EISs must “serve as the means of
assessing the environmental impact of proposed agency actions, rather than
justifying decisions already made.”58
B. Judicial Review of Agency Compliance with NEPA
The provisions of NEPA do not provide an avenue for judicial review of an
agency’s compliance with the Act. However, the CEQ regulations
acknowledge that judicial review is available after an agency has filed an EIS
or FONSI.59 The CEQ regulations similarly state that judicial review is
appropriate when an agency has taken action that will result in “irreparable
injury.”60
In one of the first major NEPA cases, the D.C. Circuit held that “[s]ection
102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and informed
decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable duties.”61 In
addition, the court noted that, “if [an agency’s] decision was reached
procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of
environmental factors—conducted fully and in good faith—it is the
responsibility of the courts to reverse.”62 Other circuits followed the D.C.
Circuit’s lead after it held that courts have the authority to review agencies’
compliance with NEPA.63 Judicial review has since become a familiar
enforcement mechanism.64

regulations, the CEQ declared that “[a]gencies shall not commit resources prejudicing selection of alternatives
before making a final decision.” Id. § 1502.2(f).
56 See 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson).
57 See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 21, at 11 (“[T]he ‘NEPA process’ is often triggered too
late to be fully effective.”).
58 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(g).
59 See id. § 1500.3.
60 Id.
61 Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 See Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments—1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 157, 303–04.
64 NEPA Litigation, supra note 16. Between 2001 and 2008, 1035 NEPA cases were filed. Id.
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When reviewing an agency’s general compliance with NEPA, courts apply
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, giving substantial deference to agency
decisions.65 However, when reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare an
EIS or when reviewing the content of an agency’s EIS, courts also employ the
hard-look doctrine.66 That is, courts seek to ensure that the agency undertook
“a thorough investigation into the environmental impacts of an agency’s action
and . . . candid[ly] acknowledg[ed] . . . the risks that those impacts entail.”67
This means that, while courts defer to decisions within an agency’s discretion,
courts also “must ‘make a searching and careful inquiry into the facts and
review whether the decision . . . was based on consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’”68
The role of the federal courts is vital to the proper functioning of NEPA69
because neither NEPA nor the CEQ regulations specify any consequences that
will befall an agency should it ignore NEPA’s requirements. Also, unlike many
environmental statutes, NEPA is not enforced by an administering executive
branch agency.70 The power of federal courts to review agency actions
therefore provides the only NEPA enforcement mechanism.
When a court determines that an agency has failed to meet its obligations
under NEPA, it must fashion a remedy. The remedy of an injunction is
particularly appropriate in the case of a NEPA violation. This equitable relief
ensures that an agency cannot take any action before completing an EIS so that
available alternatives are not foreclosed and the EIS is not biased.
Across all areas of law, federal courts apply a traditional four-factor test to
determine whether an injunction should issue.71 For an injunction to issue, a
court must find that (1) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury absent an

65

See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989) (holding that review of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that its EIS need not be supplemented “is controlled by the ‘arbitrary
and capricious’ standard”); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“[A]
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
66 See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and
1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1154–56 (2001); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
67 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005).
68 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 445 (4th Cir. 2002)).
69 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 4, 12 (noting that “the judicial branch’s administration of NEPA is of
great importance and effect” and is “as important as ever”).
70 Id. at 4.
71 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
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injunction, (2) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, (3) the balance of
the equities as to both parties weighs in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) the public
interest weighs in the plaintiff’s favor.72 An injury traditionally has been
considered irreparable when it cannot be addressed by legal remedies.73 A
legal remedy such as ex post damages would not provide redress for NEPA
plaintiffs because the harm NEPA seeks to avoid would have already
occurred.74 Monetary damages cannot undo an uninformed and biased agency
decision-making process.
As we have seen, judicial review provides the only effectual means of
forcing agency compliance with NEPA. An injunction proves the appropriate
remedy for an agency’s violation of NEPA because it ensures that the agency
does not reach a decision before completing an EIS.
II. THE HISTORY OF ISSUING INJUNCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES, WITH A FOCUS ON NEPA
This Part discusses Supreme Court cases regarding the issuance of
injunctions for violations of environmental statutes generally and then
describes how lower federal courts and the Supreme Court decide whether to
issue injunctions for NEPA violations specifically. This Part then explains the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. and Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms. In both cases, the
Court required environmental plaintiffs to show a likelihood of environmental
harm to meet the irreparable-injury requirement of injunctive relief.
A. Issuing Injunctions for Violations of Environmental Statutes Other than
NEPA: Looking to the Purpose of the Statute
In the area of environmental law, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have developed specific standards to be considered when applying the
traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief. In 1978, the Court wrote
perhaps its most remarkable opinion about granting equitable relief to prevent

72

See id.
See, e.g., Va. Petrol. Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per
curiam) (“The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date,
in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”).
74 See Sarah W. Rubenstein, Injunctions Under NEPA After Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo and Amoco
Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 5 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (1998).
73
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a violation of an environmental statute in TVA v. Hill.75 This case dealt with a
substantive, rather than procedural, violation of the Endangered Species Act of
1973.76 Yet it is relevant because it illustrates that, historically, the Court has
given much respect to the purpose of the relevant statute when deciding
whether an injunction should issue. In Hill, the Court enjoined further work on
construction of a virtually completed dam because it would have destroyed the
habitat of an endangered species: the three-inch-long snail darter.77 The Court
recognized that, to some, this injunction may seem “curious” or
“paradox[ical]”; however, the Court defended its decision, noting that “the
language, history, and structure of the legislation under review” indicated
Congress’s intent to afford protection to endangered species at all costs.78 Hill
shows the importance of a statute’s purpose when a court is considering
whether to grant equitable relief.
Four years later, the Supreme Court first addressed whether to issue an
injunction for a procedural violation of an environmental statute in Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo.79 That case involved the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act80 (FWPCA), which requires entities discharging pollution into the nation’s
waters to obtain a permit.81 Unlike NEPA, the FWPCA also sets forth
substantive requirements, including limitations on the amounts of specific
pollutants discharged by any particular entity.82 The First Circuit found that the
Navy had violated the FWPCA by discharging ordnance into water
surrounding Vieques Island without a permit and, accordingly, enjoined the
Navy from further discharging ordnance until a permit was obtained.83
However, after applying the traditional factors for granting equitable relief,
the Supreme Court reversed.84 First, the Court noted that “the basis for
injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the
inadequacy of legal remedies.”85 The Court therefore placed great weight on
75

437 U.S. 153 (1978).
See id. at 171–72 (construing Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531–1544 (2006))).
77 Id. at 172–73.
78 See id. at 172, 174.
79 456 U.S. 305, 306–07 (1982).
80 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387).
81 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1323(a).
82 Id. §§ 1341, 1362.
83 Wienberger, 456 U.S. at 307, 310.
84 Id. at 312–21.
85 Id. at 312.
76
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the fact that “[a]n injunction [was] not the only means of ensuring compliance”
with the FWPCA—“[t]he [Act] itself . . . provides for fines and criminal
penalties.”86 Next, the Court recognized that it must balance the equities to
“arrive at a ‘nice adjustment and reconciliation’ between the competing
claims.”87 Also important to the Court’s analysis were the “public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”88 Here,
the public interest was not threatened because no environmental harm was
occurring.89
Most important to the Court, though, was the purpose of the FWPCA,
which is to preserve the integrity of the nation’s waters, rather than to ensure
compliance with the permit process.90 In this instance, the Navy’s actions had
not caused pollution of the waters and had not violated any of the FWPCA’s
substantive requirements.91 Therefore, declining to issue an injunction would
not undermine the purpose of the Act.92 Accordingly, the Court held that
enjoining the Navy’s activity was inappropriate in this instance.93
Five years later, the Court revisited whether to issue an injunction for a
procedural violation of an environmental statute in Amoco Production Co. v.
Village of Gambell.94 That case involved the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act95 (ANILCA), which requires federal agencies to evaluate the
effect of potential land leases on the use of that land by Native Americans for
subsistence purposes.96 Unlike NEPA, ANILCA sets forth substantive
requirements meant to guide an agency’s decision-making process after the
agency has performed the requisite evaluation.97 The Ninth Circuit found that

86

Id. at 314.
Id. at 312 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
88 See id. (citing R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)).
89 Id. at 315, 320.
90 See id. at 314 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)).
91 Id. at 309.
92 Id. at 315.
93 Id. at 311.
94 480 U.S. 531, 534 (1987).
95 Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 42, and 43
U.S.C.).
96 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (2006).
97 See id. Section 810 of ANILCA states:
87

No such withdrawal, reservation, lease, permit, or other use, occupancy or disposition of such
lands which would significantly restrict subsistence uses shall be effected until the head of such
Federal agency— . . . determines that (A) such a significant restriction of subsistence uses is
necessary, consistent with sound management principles for the utilization of the public lands,
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the Secretary of the Interior had violated ANILCA by authorizing the lease of
certain land parcels to oil and gas companies before performing an evaluation
of effects on subsistence resources.98 The Ninth Circuit thus enjoined further
use of the leases.99
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred when it granted an
injunction.100 To reach this conclusion, the Court used the traditional factors of
equitable relief.101 When considering each factor, the Court focused on the
purpose of the relevant statute, as it did in Romero-Barcelo.102 First, the Court
noted that “the bases for injunctive relief are irreparable injury and inadequacy
of legal remedies.”103 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s contention that
“[i]rreparable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly
the environmental impact of a proposed action.”104 The Court thus answered in
the negative the threshold question of whether a procedural violation of
ANILCA was enough to constitute irreparable injury. Instead, the Court held
that there was no irreparable injury in this case because the leases would have
no significant effect on subsistence resources, meaning they would not violate
ANILCA’s substantive requirements.105 Thus, the withholding of an injunction
would not undercut the relevant statute’s overarching purpose—the
preservation of natural resources relied on for subsistence purposes.106
Next, the Court recognized that the interests of the competing parties ought
to be considered.107 The Court found that an injunction would harm the lessees,

(B) the proposed activity will involve the minimal amount of public lands necessary to
accomplish the purposes of such use, occupancy, or other disposition, and (C) reasonable steps
will be taken to minimize adverse impacts upon subsistence uses and resources resulting from
such actions.
Id. Justice White noted that “[s]ection 810 does not prohibit all federal land use actions which would adversely
affect subsistence resources but . . . provides that actions which would significantly restrict subsistence uses
can only be undertaken if they are necessary and if the adverse effects are minimized.” Amoco Prod. Co., 480
U.S. at 544.
98 Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 534.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 546.
101 See id. at 542.
102 Id. at 544.
103 Id. at 542.
104 Id. at 544–45 (alteration in original) (quoting Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. 531) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 See id. at 545.
106 See id. at 544–45.
107 See id. at 545.
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who had already committed $70 million to exploration of the land.108
Accordingly, the balance of the equities weighed in the lessees’ favor. Turning
to the public interest at stake, the Court noted that, although the preservation of
subsistence resources was a relevant public interest, nothing in the statute
expressed a congressional intent that subsistence uses should always trump
other public interests.109 In this case, the Court decided that the development of
energy resources was a more important public interest.110 Having considered
all the factors, the Court decided an injunction was inappropriate in this
instance.111
However, in an important dictum, the Court stated, “Environmental injury,
by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is
often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable.”112 Accordingly,
while the Court had no reason to think environmental harm would result from
the continuance of the particular land lease in Amoco Production Co., the
Court left open the possibility that almost any environmental harm would
constitute irreparable injury in other cases. The Court went on to say that,
when environmental harm is “sufficiently likely, . . . the balance of harms will
usually favor the issuance of an injunction.”113
Romero-Barcelo and Amoco Production Co. mark the beginning of the
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the issuance of injunctions for procedural
violations of environmental statutes. In both cases, the Court gave substantial
weight to the overarching purpose of the relevant act. Each act’s purpose was
accomplished through not only procedural standards but also substantive
requirements. Therefore, the Court viewed the procedures of each act—the
permit process pursuant to FWPCA and the evaluation of potential land leases
pursuant to ANILCA—as relatively less important because they were merely a
means to an end. However, unlike FWPCA and ANILCA, NEPA contains only
procedural requirements. The procedures provide the sole mechanism through
which NEPA’s purpose—ensuring informed agency decision making—can be
achieved. Accordingly, the Court should give substantial weight to NEPA’s
procedures when deciding whether to issue an injunction after an agency
violates the Act.
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id. at 545–46.
See id.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 545.
Id.
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B. Issuing Injunctions for Violations of NEPA
1. Lower Federal Courts’ Jurisprudence: What Is the Purpose of NEPA?
Lower federal courts read the opinions of Romero-Barcelo and Amoco
Production Co. to apply to NEPA cases.114 Thus, these courts apply the
traditional four-factor test,115 albeit in different ways,116 when deciding
whether an injunction should issue until an agency corrects its NEPA violation.
Some lower federal courts have correctly interpreted these two cases to
mean a court should look to the purpose of NEPA when deciding whether an
injunction should issue. The First Circuit’s case law provides a good example.
That Circuit does not define the purpose of NEPA as the prevention of possible
environmental harm but rather as a tool to influence agencies’ decision-making
processes.117 Thus, a violation of NEPA, even absent a showing of imminent or
future environmental harm, constitutes irreparable injury.118 This makes sense
given that NEPA has no substantive mandates and thus loses all potency if an
impact statement is not completed before an agency decides whether to
proceed with a proposed project.119 The First Circuit has also pointed out that it

114 The Supreme Court had not answered the precise question of whether injunctions should issue for
NEPA violations until after Amoco Production Co. Accordingly, Amoco Production Co. and Romero-Barcelo
were the only controlling cases. The Court had, however, discussed the issue in dictum prior to RomeroBarcelo. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 407 (1976). In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that irreparable harm occurs when an impact statement pursuant to NEPA is due but
not filed. Id. Although the Supreme Court ultimately found an injunction to be inappropriate for reasons not
relevant here, the Court did not reject this definition of irreparable harm. Id.
115 See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Amoco Prod. Co.,
480 U.S. at 542, and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)) (noting that the “general
equitable standards for the issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental statutes” are irreparable injury
and the inadequacy of legal remedies, and applying them to a NEPA case).
116 See generally Rubenstein, supra note 74, at 13–17 (describing the ways in which lower federal courts
have applied the traditional four-factor test in NEPA cases).
117 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit
conceptualizes the purpose of NEPA in a similar way. See Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 426 (7th
Cir. 1984) (“[T]he goal of NEPA is to force agencies to consider the environmental consequences of major
federal actions.”). The Seventh Circuit thus defined irreparable injury as an agency’s predisposal to a particular
outcome due to investment in a project prior to preparation of an impact statement. Id. at 426–27 (citing Watt,
716 F.2d at 952–53). In doing so, the Seventh Circuit recognized the importance of an EIS’s timing.
118 Watt, 716 F.2d at 952–53 (holding that irreparable injury would occur if an oil lease were not enjoined
and if a court were to later determine that a supplemental EIS was required).
119 Id. at 952 (“It is appropriate for the courts to recognize [a procedural violation of NEPA as injury], for
it reflects the very theory upon which NEPA is based—a theory aimed at presenting governmental decisionmakers with relevant environmental data before they commit themselves to a course of action.”).
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does not consider this irreparable injury to be a “procedural” harm.120 Rather,
the harm lies in the risk to the environment that occurs when an agency fails to
consider potential environmental ramifications of its proposed action.121
Importantly, the First Circuit’s understanding of irreparable injury does not
mean an injunction is presumed when a NEPA violation has occurred—the
balancing process still could lead to the conclusion that an injunction is
inappropriate in certain cases, depending on how the remaining three factors
tip the scale.122 This ensures that, even though environmental plaintiffs enjoy a
low threshold for proving irreparable injury, absurd results will be avoided
because a court must consider the other factors of the traditional test.
The First Circuit recognizes the difference between the injuries posed by a
violation of a part-procedural, part-substantive environmental statute, like
ANILCA, and a purely procedural statute, such as NEPA.123 Imagine an
agency that, after violating ANILCA’s procedural requirements, goes forward
with a project that also violates its substantive requirements. To comply with
ANILCA’s substantive requirements, that agency would be required to reverse
whatever steps it had already taken regardless of the amount of time or
resources dedicated to the project.124 Now imagine an agency that fails to
prepare an EIS but makes a decision and embarks on a course of action
anyway. Because NEPA contains no substantive mandates, an agency would
not be required by the Act itself to abort the current project and choose a
different course, even if the agency action turns out to be environmentally
harmful.125 The most a court could do is pause the agency action while an EIS
is prepared and considered.126 Ultimately, though, the agency still could go
through with its initial decision.127 Indeed, this would be likely because the
agency already would have invested time and resources in the project.128 Thus,
the “risk” to the environment described by the First Circuit129 is a risk in every

120

Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
122 Id. at 504.
123 See id. at 503–04.
124 See id. at 503.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 500 (“[T]he harm consists of the added risk to the environment that takes place when
governmental decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis . . . of the likely
effects of their decision upon the environment.”).
121
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sense of the word—NEPA provides no protection whatsoever from an agency
that ignores the Act’s procedures.130
In contrast to the First Circuit, other lower federal courts, including those
of the Ninth Circuit, take a slightly different approach when deciding whether
to issue an injunction. In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, the
Ninth Circuit stated, “Where an EIS is required, allowing a potentially
environmentally damaging project to proceed prior to its preparation runs
contrary to the very purpose of the statutory requirement.”131 From this
conceptualization of NEPA’s purpose, it follows that irreparable injury is
found only when an agency fails to follow the Act’s procedures and the
agency’s proposed project poses an actual threat to the environment.132
However, in meeting this second requirement, the Ninth Circuit requires only
that environmental plaintiffs show the “possibility” of environmental harm at
any point during the implementation of the project.133 This has proven to be a
relatively low threshold—the early stages of a project may be enjoined, even if
not environmentally harmful, if at a later stage the project may create a threat
to the environment.134 Thus, the outcomes of most cases presented to the Ninth

130 This is why judicial review and the issuance of injunctions are so vital to enforcement of NEPA. See
discussion supra Part I.B.
131 241 F.3d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added), abrogated by Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns,
570 F.3d 1130 (2009), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010); accord
Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The balance of equities and the public interest
favor issuance of an injunction because allowing a potentially environmentally damaging program to proceed
without an adequate record of decision runs contrary to the mandate of NEPA.”).
132 See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that potential
harm to several bird species and the potential unnecessary cutting of trees constituted irreparable injury),
overruled in part by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008); see also N. Cheyenne
Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing irreparable harm as “threatened harm to the
environment, including . . . cultural, social and economic cost[s]”).
133 Earth Island Inst., 442 F.3d at 1177 (requiring “the possibility of irreparable injury” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
134 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding a district
court’s grant of an injunction against further approval or commitment of federal funds for certain airport
development projects because construction pursuant to the overall airport expansion program may be
environmentally damaging). While Friends of the Earth was decided before Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
district courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to cite Friends of the Earth and even quote its language
recognizing that irreparable injury can be presumed from a NEPA violation. See, e.g., Greenpeace Found. v.
Daley, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (D. Haw. 2000) (citing Friends of the Earth, 518 F.2d at 330) (“Irreparable
damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed
action.”); Leatherback Sea Turtle v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 99-00152 DAE, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23317, at *48 (D. Haw. Oct. 18, 1999) (citing Friends of the Earth, 518 F.2d at 300).
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Circuit are similar to the outcomes of those decided in the First Circuit.135
Indeed, in several more recent cases, the Ninth Circuit even has recognized a
definition of irreparable injury similar to that of the First Circuit.136
Other lower federal courts, such as those of the Fourth Circuit, completely
ignore the purpose of NEPA when deciding whether to order injunctive
relief.137 The Fourth Circuit, at least nominally, recognizes the harm NEPA
seeks to prevent as environmental harm.138 It also portends to recognize the
harm that occurs when an agency has foreclosed the possibility of
environmentally benign alternatives by investing in an environmentally
damaging project before preparing an EIS.139 While this standard seems lenient
for environmental plaintiffs, in application it is not.
For example, the Fourth Circuit believes “that allowing an agency to
continue work on a project while its environmental study is pending does not
necessarily create the type of option-limiting harm that NEPA seeks to
prevent.”140 Thus, this circuit refuses to enjoin nonharmful actions, even if they
are precursors to subsequent, potentially harmful actions.141 In National
Audubon Society v. Department of the Navy, for instance, the Fourth Circuit
declined to enjoin the Navy from purchasing land for a potential training site
135 Compare Friends of the Earth, 518 F.2d at 326, with Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 543,
546, 593 (D. Me. 1989) (enjoining construction of a causeway and resumption of harbor dredging in the area
of a proposed marine dry cargo terminal due to “[a] NEPA violation which deprives agency decisionmakers of
an informed awareness of significant environmental consequences of the challenged action”).
136 See, e.g., Bosworth, 510 F.3d at 1034 (“[I]n the NEPA context, irreparable injury flows from the
failure to evaluate the environmental impact of a major federal action.” (quoting High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v.
Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 738
n.18 (“[I]n Sierra Club v. Marsh, then-[First ]Circuit Judge Breyer held that, because NEPA is a purely
procedural statute, the requisite harm is the failure to follow the appropriate procedures. Marsh also justifies
injunctive relief in this case.” (citations omitted)).
137 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 201 (4th Cir. 2005). In addition to the
Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit ignores the purpose of NEPA when deciding whether to enjoin a federal
action. See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Broader injunctive relief is
appropriate . . . where substantial danger to the environment, in addition to a violation of procedural
requirements, is established.” (emphasis added)); New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 550 F.2d 745,
754 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusing to enjoin the air shipment of plutonium pending completion of an EIS because
“the challenged shipments have been made without accident over a period of 25 years”), superseded by rule,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, as recognized in Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001).
138 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 422 F.3d at 201.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 202.
141 See id. at 201; see also S.C. Dep’t of Wildlife & Marine Res. v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 97, 100–01 (4th Cir.
1989) (allowing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to install pumped storage generators at a potential dam site
prior to completion of an EIS, even though an EIS might reveal that operation of the dam would be
environmentally harmful).
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before completion of a supplemental EIS, claiming that this would not bias the
Navy’s decision regarding the location of training.142 This circuit therefore
leaves to federal agencies the decision of whether to invest in projects that later
may be found to degrade the environment.143 In this regard, the Fourth Circuit
reduces the issue of ordering injunctions to semantics and completely ignores
the purpose of NEPA—to ensure that agencies, before making a decision, have
all relevant information available to them.
To summarize, lower federal courts have adopted three distinct definitions
of irreparable harm when deciding whether to issue injunctions for NEPA
violations: a procedural violation of NEPA alone, a procedural violation
coupled with a possible threat to the environment at any point during the
agency’s proposed plan, and a procedural violation along with a possibility of
environmental harm resulting from the next step taken by the agency.
2. Winter and Geertson: The Supreme Court’s Evisceration of NEPA?
Although the precise question of whether to grant equitable relief for a
NEPA violation was not presented to the Supreme Court until 2008, the Court
had been deciding cases about NEPA generally for many years prior.144 In
these cases, the Court expressed much respect for the purpose of NEPA and
willingly enforced its procedures. For example, in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the
Court noted that NEPA “clearly states when an impact statement is required,”
that “[t]he procedural duty imposed upon agencies . . . is quite precise,” and
that “[a] court has no authority to depart from the statutory language.”145
Similarly, in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, the Court echoed
Senator Jackson’s statement that NEPA’s procedures are “action-forcing” in

142

422 F.3d at 181, 199.
S.C. Dep’t of Wildlife & Marine Res., 866 F.2d at 101 (“[W]hile the potential for financial waste may
prove more real than the financial savings gained by simultaneously proceeding with installation [of pumped
storage generators] and environmental study, this decision is one Congress has charged the Corps with
making.”). The Fourth Circuit gives this latitude to agencies, despite CEQ regulations clearly explaining that
“no action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would . . . [l]imit the choice of reasonable
alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(a) (2011). Thus, the Fourth Circuit seems to be saying that an agency does
not limit its options until it takes the very last step in implementing a project.
144 See, e.g., Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (discussing
whether NEPA requires agencies to consider the psychological and community effects of proposed actions);
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (discussing whether NEPA requires agencies to
prepare “hypothetical” EISs); Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per
curiam) (discussing whether a court may question an agency’s decision to go forward with a proposed project
when the agency fully complied with the procedural requirements of NEPA).
145 427 U.S. 390, 405–06 (1976).
143
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that they “ensure[] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available,
and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant
environmental impacts.”146
However, when faced with the precise question of whether to grant
equitable relief for a NEPA violation, the Supreme Court changed course. Like
the Fourth Circuit, the Court showed a disregard for the purpose of NEPA
when it decided Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. in 2008.147
For forty years prior to this case, the Navy had been practicing the use of midfrequency active (MFA) sonar to detect enemy submarines.148 MFA sonar is
the most effective way of identifying submerged diesel-electric submarines
operating on battery power, three hundred of which are possessed by potential
adversaries of the United States.149 The Navy had chosen southern California
as its training location because it was the “only area on the west coast that
[wa]s relatively close to land, air, and sea bases, as well as amphibious landing
areas.”150 Also off the coast of southern California is the habitat of over thirtyseven marine mammals, including dolphins, sea lions, and whales.151 The
plaintiffs in Winter contended that MFA sonar can inflict injuries, such as
hearing loss and decompression sickness, on these animals and cause
disruptions in their behavior.152 The plaintiffs also contended that “several
mass strandings of marine mammals . . . have been ‘associated’ with the use of
active sonar.”153
Despite these considerations, the Navy had concluded that preparing an EIS
was not necessary because its EA had revealed that only 8 “Level A
harassments” and 274 “Level B harassments” of the animals might occur.154
After the Navy’s EA was filed, plaintiff environmental groups brought suit,
seeking an injunction of all training exercises pending the completion of an

146

490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
148 Id. at 370.
149 Id. at 370–71.
150 Id. at 371.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 372. A Level A harassment was defined “as the potential destruction or loss of biological tissue
(i.e., physical injury).” Id. In addition to discovering the potential for eight Level A harassments, the Navy’s
computer models also predicted that such harassments “could be avoided through the Navy’s voluntary
mitigation measures.” Id. A Level B harassment was defined “as temporary injury or disruption of behavioral
patterns such as migration, feeding, surfacing, and breeding.” Id.
147
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EIS.155 The district court granted the injunction.156 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
but remanded the case to the district court to narrow the injunction so that the
Navy could continue with its training exercises, provided that it undertook
specific mitigation measures.157 The district court implemented six mitigation
measures, and the Navy appealed two of them.158 The Ninth Circuit again
affirmed, the Navy again appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.159
First, the Court established that, as in other environmental cases, the
traditional four-factor test for equitable relief applies in NEPA cases.160
However, the Court held that the plaintiffs must show a likelihood, not a mere
possibility, of irreparable injury.161 Thus, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
standard regarding whether irreparable injury is probable enough to warrant
the issuance of an injunction.162
Additionally, and implicitly rejecting the First Circuit’s approach, the Court
construed irreparable injury to mean harm to the environment, not the harm
befalling from an agency’s failure to consider all environmental ramifications
of a proposed project.163 Interestingly, the Court seemed willing to entertain
contentions that harm to humans in the way of “scientific[] and recreational
interests” could suffice as irreparable injury.164 Ultimately, however, the Court
determined that the plaintiffs had not made the requisite showing of irreparable

155
156
157
158

See id. at 366, 373.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 373. The mitigation measures included the following:
(1) imposing a 12 nautical mile “exclusion zone” from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to
conduct additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3) restricting the use of “helicopterdipping” sonar; (4) limiting the use of MFA solar in geographic “choke points”; (5) shutting
down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6)
powering down MFA sonar by [six decibels] during significant surface ducting conditions.

Id. The Navy appealed the last two listed mitigation measures. Id.
159 Id. at 373–74.
160 See id.
161 Id. at 375. The Ninth Circuit requires only that environmental plaintiffs show a possibility of
environmental harm. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
162 See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375.
163 Id. at 377 (describing “the possible harm to . . . ecological . . . interests”).
164 See id. at 377–78. For example, the Court “d[id] not question the seriousness of” the plaintiffs’
declarations that they take whale watching trips, observe and take photographs of marine mammals in their
natural habitats, and conduct scientific research on marine mammals. Id.
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injury because they had shown only the possibility, and not a likelihood, of
harm to an unknown number of marine mammals.165
Even if the plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury, it would not have
mattered. The Court’s decision ultimately hinged upon the balancing-of-theequities and public-interest factors.166 The Court held that the Navy’s interest
in continuing training outweighed the plaintiffs’ ecological interests because
“deploy[ing] an inadequately trained antisubmarine force [would] jeopardize[]
the safety of the fleet.”167 Therefore, the balance of the equities favored the
Navy.168 When examining this factor, the Court placed special emphasis on the
ability of the Navy to be prepared for war.169 Finally, the public interest in
national security outweighed the plaintiffs’ concerns.170 Accordingly, to grant
an injunction would be inappropriate in this case.171
Although the Court held irreparable injury to mean environmental harm,
the Court noted, in dictum, that “[p]art of the harm NEPA attempts to prevent
in requiring an EIS is that, without one, there may be little if any information
about prospective environmental harms and potential mitigating measures.”172
Perhaps, then, the Navy’s NEPA violations were not so egregious—the Navy
was not conducting a new activity with completely unknown environmental
effects.173 Rather, the Navy had been using MFA sonar for over forty years.174
One could therefore make the argument that the Navy already had all the
necessary information before it, and the Court took special note of this fact.175
Two years later, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the Court
dashed any hope that it would not continue to weaken NEPA.176 The issues in
Geertson arose over the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s
(APHIS) decision to completely deregulate the genetically modified organism
Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), produced by Monsanto Company.177
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See id. at 376, 378.
See id. at 377–78.
Id. at 378.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 382.
Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See id.
See 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2748 (2010).
Id. at 2750.
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Monsanto, which also produces the herbicide Roundup, had petitioned APHIS
for delisting RRA under the Plant Protection Act (PPA).178 APHIS granted
Monsanto’s request, issuing an EA and subsequently a FONSI in the
process.179
Environmental plaintiffs sued, claiming that APHIS should have prepared
an EIS.180 The district court and Ninth Circuit agreed, noting that an EIS would
allow APHIS to make two necessary determinations: “[F]irst, the extent to
which complete deregulation would lead to the transmission of the gene
conferring glyphosphate tolerance [Roundup resistance] from RRA to organic
and conventional alfalfa; and, second, the extent to which the introduction of
RRA would contribute to the development of Roundup-resistant weeds.”181 An
injunction against all future planting of RRA pending a completed EIS was
issued with a temporary exception for the farmers who had relied on APHIS’s
deregulation in good faith.182 An injunction against any partial deregulation of
RRA also was entered.183 Monsanto appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.184
In reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court applied a
slightly different four-factor test for issuing an injunction.185 The Court held
that
[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
186
disserved by a permanent injunction.

The potential effect of this different test on future cases remains unclear.187
178

Id.
Id.
180 Id. at 2750–51.
181 Id. at 2751–52.
182 See id. at 2751.
183 Id. at 2758.
184 Id. at 2752.
185 See id. at 2756.
186 Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
187 The Court cited its recent opinion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C. for this new test. Id. (citing
547 U.S. at 391). In eBay, the Court claimed to use the “traditional” test. See 547 U.S. at 390. However, some
scholars have suggested that the Court inadvertently changed the law regarding the “traditional” test for
equitable relief. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at
179
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Using this test, the Court vacated both injunctions entered by the Ninth
Circuit.188 The Court took particular issue with the injunction against any
partial deregulation, claiming that the partial deregulation need not cause any
irreparable injury to plaintiffs so long as its scope was sufficiently limited.189
Here, the Court ignored the very language contained in the CEQ regulations
that it had cited only pages earlier: actions that would “[h]ave an adverse
environmental impact” or “[l]imit the choice of reasonable alternatives” may
not be taken by an agency while it completes the NEPA process.190
In addressing the first prong of this CEQ regulation, the Court made a
tenuous argument that a partial deregulation need not harm the environment
and cause irreparable injury.191 The Court rested its ultimate decision not to
issue an injunction on this contention.192 The Court’s reasoning illustrates the
difficulty environmental plaintiffs now encounter after Winter, which held that
environmental plaintiffs must show a “likelihood” of environmental harm to
demonstrate irreparable injury.193 The district court in Geertson made the
following factual findings: (1) planting RRA can cause genetic contamination
of other crops, (2) contamination had occurred in controlled settings, (3)
APHIS is unable to effectively monitor or enforce limitations on planting, and
(4) “genetic contamination . . . could decimate . . . the American alfalfa
market.”194 However, the Court did not act in accordance with these findings,
13–14) (on file with author); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007) (“Remedies specialists had never heard of the four-point
test. Although one might argue that the four points can be found in Weinberger, the Court appears to vindicate
a ‘traditional’ standard for a final injunction that never existed . . . .”). On remand from the Supreme Court, the
trial court of eBay even said, “The irreparable harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides
of the same coin; however, the court will address them separately in order to conform with the four-factor test
as outlined by the Supreme Court.” MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 n.11 (E.D.
Va. 2007).
The explicit bifurcation of the irreparable-injury and inadequacy-of-legal-remedies factors may place
even more of a burden on plaintiffs to show what the Court considers irreparable injury. That is, plaintiffs must
always show a likelihood of environmental harm, per Winter, in addition to inadequacy of legal remedies.
Inadequacy of legal remedies is no longer enough, even though traditionally it has been.
188 Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2756, 2762.
189 Id. at 2760.
190 Id. at 2750.
191 See id. at 2760.
192 See id. at 2760–61.
193 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
194 See Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These factual findings also lend
support to the argument that partial deregulation could bias APHIS’s complete deregulation decision. When
dealing with a biological process such as genetic intermingling of plants—a mechanism that is affected by
unpredictable forces, such as wind and animal transfer—a partial deregulation could lead to the same results as
a complete deregulation. See Brief for Amici Curiae Union of Concerned Scientists et al. in Support of
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instead relying on a single study within the voluminous record.195 Additionally,
the Court ignored the fact that RRA is the first crop engineered to resist an
herbicide and known to transmit the genetically engineered gene to other
plants.196 By ignoring these realities, the Court turned its back on part of the
reasoning employed in Winter, in which the Court lifted an injunction with the
knowledge that the enjoined practices were not novel.197
The Court did not address the second prong of the aforementioned CEQ
regulations—the potential for limiting the choice of reasonable
alternatives198—at all. Certainly, the district court was correct in believing that
any partial deregulation, even if environmentally benign, could limit APHIS’s
range of available alternatives and bias the EIS that it had been ordered to
complete.199 For example, a partial deregulation could ease the transition to a
complete deregulation and increase market demand for RRA. Therefore, if
APHIS partially deregulated RRA while simultaneously completing its EIS,
APHIS might be especially tempted to go through with the complete
deregulation. The Supreme Court ignored this potential for agency bias and,
thus, the purpose of NEPA—to ensure that agencies objectively examine the
potential environmental consequences of their actions. In this way, the Court
adopted the Fourth Circuit’s view with respect to NEPA injunctions200—
precursors to decisions requiring an EIS may proceed, even though these
actions could cause agency bias during the EIS process, thereby influencing
the agency’s ultimate decision.

Geertson Respondents at 28, Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No. 09-475) (noting the ease with which
RRA’s genes may flow into wild and conventional alfalfa crops); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Cropp
Cooperative et al. in Support of Respondents at 25, Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No. 09-475)
(noting that, “through the physical destruction of the competitive products through contamination,” “the
unregulated release of RRA would result in loss of farmers’ chosen livelihood of organic farming”).
195 See Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2770 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court’s opinion also failed
to consider other disturbing consequences of RRA use. See, e.g., CHARLES BENBROOK, ORGANIC CTR.,
IMPACTS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON PESTICIDE USE: THE FIRST THIRTEEN YEARS 3 (2009)
(describing how genetically engineered crops have been responsible for an increase in pesticide use); William
Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Rise of the Superweeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at B1 (explaining how the use
of Roundup-resistant crops leads to the creations of “superweeds” resistant to conventional pesticides); Lucia
Graves, Roundup Birth Defects: Regulators Knew World’s Best-Selling Herbicide Causes Problems, New
Report Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/07/
roundup-birth-defects-herbicide-regulators_n_872862.html (explaining Earth Open Source’s finding that
industry regulators have known since 1980 that Roundup causes birth defects).
196 See Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 See id. at 2768.
198 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
199 See Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200 See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text.

GWYN GALLEYSFINAL

376

3/20/2012 9:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:349

These two cases—Winter and, especially, Geertson—represent the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to issue injunctions for NEPA violations and,
consequently, represent a potential weakening of the Act. NEPA consists
solely of procedural requirements, and its purpose is to make agencies aware of
the potential environmental ramifications of their actions. Injunctive relief
requires agencies to complete an EIS before reaching a decision. Thus, by
refusing to issue injunctions, the Court is undermining the purpose of NEPA.
III. WHY WINTER AND GEERTSON ARE NOT THE END OF NEPA
This Part explains how the holdings of Winter and Geertson can be limited
to their unique facts. Because of these unique facts, the approach federal courts
should take when confronted with a more typical NEPA case remains unclear.
Thus, this Part clarifies what the framework for this type of case should be by
attempting to harmonize Winter and Geertson with the Court’s wellestablished precedent in this area of the law. Specifically, this Comment argues
that a showing of likely environmental harm is superfluous and proposes that
irreparable harm be presumed when an agency violates NEPA’s procedures.
This presumption of irreparable harm necessarily would lead to injunctive
relief being granted more readily.
A. How to Limit Winter and Geertson in the Future
If read expansively, Winter and Geertson have raised the bar for
environmental plaintiffs by requiring a likelihood of environmental harm in all
NEPA cases. However, in neither case did the Supreme Court declare that it
was changing prevailing law. Thus, the holdings of these cases should be
limited in the future.
When interpreting Winter, federal courts should remember that the Court’s
perspective can be summed up by the first line of Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion: “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of
preserving peace.”201 Winter involved training practices imperative to the
Navy’s preparedness and the nation’s security.202 So, while injunctions

201

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 370 (2008) (quoting George Washington,
President, First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 65, 65 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat’l Literature & Art 1908) (1897)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
202 See Joel R. Reynolds et al., No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of Winter v. NRDC, 36 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 753, 769–70 (2009) (“Winter stands for the narrow proposition that an injunction found to ‘jeopardiz[e]
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normally may issue for a violation of NEPA, when an extreme circumstance
presents itself, as in Winter, an injunction would be inappropriate. This is not
to say that an injunction is presumed to issue in a NEPA case. Rather,
descriptively speaking, injunctions may be found proper in the vast majority of
cases exhibiting more typical facts. Further support for this conclusion is found
in the Court’s reiteration in the final paragraph of its opinion that it “d[id] not
discount the importance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scientific, and recreational
interests in marine mammals.”203 Rather, these interests were merely
outweighed.204 Thus, given normal circumstances, the plaintiffs’ interests may
have warranted an injunction. Additionally, Winter stands for the notion that
only a crucial military practice may outweigh environmental concerns.205
On a related note, Winter highlights the Court’s duty to defer to the military
when dealing with an issue such as national security.206 Even if the Court had
not viewed national security interests as trumping environmental interests, it
still must have given great weight to the military’s assertions that MFA sonar
is absolutely necessary to the training of soldiers.207 This is why, in its opinion,
the Court repeatedly stressed that it was acting in accordance with declarations
of the Navy’s most senior officers, as well as a determination made by the
President that MFA sonar was “essential.”208 This does not mean a federal
court should defer to any agency’s declaration just because that agency has
more subject-matter expertise and experience than the court.209 Instead, Winter
stands for the more narrow proposition that, in an area where the Executive
Branch traditionally exercises vast amounts of power, such as providing for the

national security’ should not issue when there is insufficient evidence of harm to the environment.” (alteration
in original)).
203 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 382.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 378 (“Of course, military interests do not always trump other considerations, and we have not
held that they do.”).
206 See id. at 377.
207 See id. (“We ‘give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest.’” (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1986)).
208 Id. at 373, 377–80.
209 It may seem like a logical extension of Winter to claim that all agencies warrant great deference in
NEPA violation cases. See Reply Brief for the Federal Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 14, Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2643 (2010) (No. 09-475). But once logically extended, this
argument’s flaw becomes apparent. For example, it is untrue to say that a federal court must defer to APHIS’s
(hypothetical) declaration that deregulation of RRA is so imperative that an injunction against the action would
cause some sort of national crisis that is comparable to the Navy being unable to defend the country.
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national defense, a court may be required to defer to the judgments of that
branch.
Similarly, Geertson can be limited to its unique facts. In this opinion, the
Supreme Court devoted much space to a hypothetical partial deregulation it
thought (perhaps mistakenly) would not lead to the environmental damage of
which plaintiffs were wary.210 The Court listed several limitations that APHIS
might impose on farmers seeking to take advantage of this hypothetical partial
deregulation.211 In reality, however, APHIS never before had granted partial
approval of a petition for nonregulated status.212 Thus, it was unclear what
exact mechanism APHIS actually would employ to effectuate this sort of
partial deregulation.213 In his dissent, Justice Stevens speculated that this
partial deregulation would be pursuant to the PPA’s current case-specific
permit process or a proposed new PPA “special case[]” system of deregulation
subject to agency oversight.214 Either way, the partial deregulation would be
subject to a substantive environmental regulation.215 Thus, Geertson can be
limited by the fact that additional protection would be provided through
substantive requirements separate from the NEPA process. While all agency
actions invariably will be governed by some sort of substantive law or
regulation, and many will be addressed by a substantive environmental law,
some will not be addressed by a substantive environmental law relevant to
environmental plaintiffs’ concerns. The latter group of agency actions
therefore can be distinguished from the circumstances of Geertson.
210

See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2760.
Id.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 2768 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord id. at 2767 n.6 (“One of the many matters not briefed in
this case is how limited a partial deregulation can be. It is not clear whether the sort of extremely limited
‘partial deregulations’ envisioned by the Court, in which RRA is ‘deregulated’ in one small geographic area
pursuant to stringent restrictions, could be achieved only through ‘partial deregulation’ actions, or whether
they could also (or exclusively) be achieved through a more case-specific permit process.” (citation omitted)).
215 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(b)(10)–(12) (2011) (describing the current permit process, which requires “[a]
detailed description of the processes, procedures, and safeguards which have been used or will be used in the
country of origin and in the United States to prevent contamination, release, and dissemination . . . [and a]
detailed description of the proposed procedures, processes, and safeguards which will be used to prevent
escape and dissemination of the regulated article at each of the intended destinations”); see also Introduction
of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,021, 39,022,
39,024 (July 17, 2007) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340) (“The [proposed] new system could include
processes and criteria to allow release and use, with some restrictions, for special cases where there were
minor risks that could be mitigated with conditions to ensure safe commercial use.”). Additionally, the
proposed “special-case” deregulation scheme has been subjected to its own NEPA process. See generally id. at
39,022–25.
211
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If read expansively, Winter and Geertson will significantly weaken NEPA.
However, because of the unique facts described above, these were not typical
NEPA cases. Therefore, the holdings of these cases can be limited. Indeed,
these holdings must be limited to harmonize them with the enacting Congress’s
vision of NEPA, Romero-Barcelo and Amoco Production Co., and the Court’s
precedent regarding NEPA. The question remains: What is the appropriate
framework for a typical NEPA case?
B. How to Harmonize Winter and Geertson with Precedent and the Purpose
of NEPA
Federal courts should read Winter and Geertson narrowly so as to
harmonize their holdings with the enacting Congress’s vision of NEPA, as well
as the Supreme Court’s precedent.216 The Court never said in Winter or in
Geertson that it was changing prevailing law. Instead, these cases presented
unique circumstances—national security considerations in Winter and the
additional protection of a substantive environmental law in Geertson—and do
not represent the approach that should be used in a typical NEPA case. So what
is the appropriate framework? Just as in Romero-Barcelo and Amoco
Production Co., federal courts should look to the purpose of the statute at hand
when deciding whether to issue injunctions for NEPA violations.217 Taking
NEPA’s purpose to heart means NEPA will retain force in the future.
Although some commentators disagree,218 considering the purpose of
NEPA is not a vague undertaking. The First Circuit got it right when it said
216 Some lower federal courts’ recent trademark decisions have followed the approach espoused in
Romero-Barcelo and Amoco Production Co., and therefore may be declining to read Winter expansively. See
Thomas M. Williams, Winter v. NRDC: A Stricter Standard for Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases?, 91 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 571, 574–76 (2009). Prior to Winter, trademark plaintiffs enjoyed a
presumption of irreparable injury, “even absent a showing of business loss.” Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992). Even after Winter, in Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit held that courts may continue to presume irreparable injury in trademark cases “because trademark
damages are, by their very nature, irreparable.” No. CV 09-4859 AHM (Ex), 2009 WL 2489223, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 2009).
217 The notion that a court should look to the purpose of the relevant statute when granting equitable relief
is not limited to environmental cases. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal
Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1356 (2000) (“There seems to be no way to decide how to characterize
injuries without looking at the harms that the underlying legal provision is aimed to prevent.”).
218 See, e.g., Avalyn Taylor, Rethinking the Irreparable Harm Factor in Wildlife Mortality Cases, 2 STAN.
J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 113, 139 (2009) (“[U]nlike the [Endangered Species Act] and [the Marine Mammal
Protection Act], in which the primary harms the statutes intend to prohibit are relatively easy to identify,
defining the scope and nature of the primary harm to be considered under NEPA is much more challenging.
This is largely because the ‘primary goals’ of the statute are very broad . . . .”).
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NEPA exists to influence agencies’ decision-making processes.219 The Act’s
procedural mandates, rather than any substantive provisions, are essential to
that purpose.220 Accordingly, there should be a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable injury when an agency has violated NEPA’s procedures. An injury
is suffered by the public, and thus environmental plaintiffs, when an agency
initiates a proposed action without considering its environmental effects. The
injury lies in harm to the informed decision-making process envisioned by
NEPA’s enacting Congress. A showing of likely environmental harm is
superfluous. Defining irreparable injury as a procedural violation would be
ideal because it would (1) put environmental plaintiffs’ burden of proof at a
proper level, (2) appropriately broaden the scope of relief granted for NEPA
violations, (3) provide clarity for courts and parties alike, and most
importantly, (4) help ensure that EISs are completed at the proper time.
First, requiring plaintiffs to show only a NEPA violation, rather than likely
environmental harm, would set plaintiffs’ burden of proof at a reasonable level.
The end goal of an EIS is to discover the very environmental harm that the
Supreme Court currently requires environmental plaintiffs to show. An
agency’s use of its own expertise and resources, through completion of an EIS,
is sometimes the only way to show with any certainty (or, more accurately,
with the degree of certainty currently required by the Court) the potential for
environmental degradation, especially when a novel practice with unknown
effects is at issue. In such circumstances, requiring plaintiffs to make a
showing of environmental harm forces them to perform what actually is the

219

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983).
See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 21, at 37 (describing the “[p]rocedural mandate” of
NEPA as a federal agency’s duty “to use a planning and decision-making process for developing or
considering the approval of plans, policies, programs or projects that gives ‘appropriate consideration to
environmental values and amenities,’ which occurs mainly through the analysis of environmental impacts and
alternatives, including mitigation measures”).
220
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agency’s task221—a task requiring resources and expertise that persons outside
of the agency often do not have.222
Recognizing irreparable injury as a violation of NEPA’s procedures is
important to set environmental plaintiffs’ burden of proof at an appropriate
level in another way as well. The irreparable-injury factor is the sine qua non
of injunctive relief in that most courts require a showing of irreparable harm
before moving on to the other factors.223 In this way, it acts as an initial
threshold that plaintiffs must overcome. Therefore, using the Supreme Court’s
standard for irreparable injury—a likelihood of harm to the environment—can
create an insurmountable barrier for environmental plaintiffs in a typical
NEPA case.
Geertson illustrates the type of unfortunate result that may occur when the
standard for irreparable injury, the initial threshold that must be met for
injunctive relief, is too high.224 By finding that irreparable injury was not
present in Geertson, the Supreme Court avoided the necessity of analyzing
whether the injunction would benefit the public interest, as well as the balance
of the equities. The scale would have tipped in favor of enjoining partial
deregulation, given the significant public interest in avoiding potential
disastrous consequences, such as contamination of organic and conventional
alfalfa crops.225 If organic or conventional crops were to become contaminated,
farmers of these crops would lose sales domestically.226 Also, exports of these
221 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“[Monsanto and
APHIS] are seeking to penalize Plaintiffs, as well as the environment, because the precise effects from these
plantings are not yet known. However, ‘this lack of precision is the result of [APHIS’s] failure to conduct an
environmental evaluation prior to’ issuing these permits.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2009)), vacated, 636 F.3d 1166
(9th Cir. 2011); see also Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality, to the Heads
of Fed. Dep’ts & Agencies 7 (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley], available at
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100218-nepa-consideration-effects-ghg-draftguidance.pdf (noting that the “likelihood of [the] future condition” is the very thing an EIS’s discussion of
climate change seeks to determine).
222 See DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 5.03(3)(a), at 5-21
(2006) (“[I]rreparable injury, the key factor in prayers for interlocutory relief, is either difficult or extremely
costly to prove.”).
223 Taylor, supra note 218, at 115 (citing RIESEL, supra note 222).
224 See supra notes 176–200 and accompanying text.
225 See Voosen, supra note 4 (“‘[T]his talk about science and science based-analysis on the part of
proponents of GM crops is very misleading,’ [said University of Arkansas agricultural law professor Susan
Schneider]. ‘The science is that we cannot contain GM crops without significant restrictions. The policy
issue—the real issue here—is whether we care.’” (emphasis added)). Even with restrictions in place, there is
no guarantee of the complete absence of Roundup Ready genes in organic and conventional alfalfa. Id.
226 See Pollack, supra note 4.
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organic or conventional crops to certain countries would be jeopardized by the
possible detection of genetically engineered material.227
Additionally, in Geertson, the district court already had balanced the harms
fairly because its injunction made a temporary exception for farmers who had
relied in good faith on APHIS’s deregulation.228 The Court cited no reason
why Monsanto would be harmed by the temporary injunction of partial
deregulation.229 If an injunction had been issued, Monsanto merely would have
had to wait until an EIS was prepared. Comparing this inconvenience with the
harm that could occur to organic and conventional farmers speaks for itself. If
the Supreme Court had been required to investigate the other factors—as a
result of a lower standard for the threshold factor of irreparable injury—the
Court’s decision may have been different. Thus, to avoid unfortunate outcomes
similar to the outcome of Geertson, the threshold factor of irreparable injury
should be presumed when an agency violates NEPA’s procedures.
Second, allowing a procedural violation to suffice as irreparable injury
would appropriately broaden the scope of scenarios for which courts can grant
relief. NEPA is triggered by actions “significantly affecting” the
environment.230 The CEQ regulations interpret the word “[a]ffecting” to mean
“will or may have an effect on.”231 The inclusion of “may” captures the notion
that an EIS serves to shed light on effects that may be speculative but
nonetheless important to consider.232 Adverse environmental effects do not
have to be likely for an agency to be beholden to NEPA’s procedures. If NEPA
were triggered only by a “likelihood” of specific effects resulting from an
agency action, then it would make sense to require environmental plaintiffs to
show this potentiality as well. But because the degree of certainty that the CEQ
requires to trigger NEPA is less than the degree of certainty that the Court
requires of plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate irreparable injury, the Court’s
jurisprudence inappropriately narrows the scope of relief available under
NEPA.

227

Id.
See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2751 (2010).
229 See supra notes 176–200 and accompanying text.
230 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
231 40 C.F.R. § 1508.3 (2011).
232 See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Preparation of
an EIS is mandated where uncertainty may be resolved by further collection of data . . . .”); see also 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.27(b)(5) (noting that an agency must state in its EIS “[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the
human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks”).
228
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The issue of climate change provides a relevant example of circumstances
that could trigger the NEPA process under the CEQ guidelines but might not
create the likelihood of environmental harm demanded by the Supreme Court
for an injunction. While it is not settled law that an agency must consider
climate-change-related effects in an EIS, federal courts are increasingly
expecting thorough analysis of such effects.233 Additionally, the CEQ recently
released draft guidance explaining when and how agencies should address the
effects of greenhouse gases in their EISs.234 The CEQ suggested that
“important” but “significant[ly] uncertain[]” climate change effects should be
considered.235 The CEQ listed the “approval of a large solid waste landfill;
approval of energy facilities such as a coal-fired power plant; or authorization
of a methane venting coal mine” as examples of instances when an agency
should discuss climate change effects.236
The CEQ recognized in its guidance that it “is difficult to isolate and to
understand” the link between a particular project and “specific climatological
changes.”237 It is similarly difficult to link climatological changes to specific
environmental harms.238 Furthermore, climate change is not caused by any
single agency action but rather the cumulative impacts of many dispersed—in
both time and geography—actions. Thus, one can imagine the difficulty
environmental plaintiffs would encounter when attempting to prove that a
specific project presents a “likelihood” of harm to the environment in the way
of climatological effects. The tension between NEPA’s broad coverage and the
Court’s high standard for environmental plaintiffs is clear.
Third, and more practically, requiring only a showing of a NEPA violation
would lead to less confusion for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts alike. At
least one scholar has argued that, when considering a request for injunctive
relief, “courts should consider whether the action plaintiffs seek to enjoin

233 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 550 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative
impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.”), vacated and withdrawn on denial of reh’g, 538
F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008); Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028–
29 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding an EA to be inadequate because of its failure to thoroughly assess the effects of
carbon dioxide emissions from a natural gas turbine).
234 Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, supra note 221, at 1, 4–5.
235 Id.at 7.
236 Id. at 3.
237 Id.
238 See id. at 10 (“Nearly every aspect of energy choices and use affect the development of fossil fuel and
other energy resources, either adding to or reducing the cumulative total of [greenhouse gas] emissions.”).
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would cause irreparable harm to any of the interests protected by NEPA’s
primary goals, including the natural environment, human health and welfare,
and efforts to promote the ‘productive and enjoyable harmony’ between the
two.”239 But this type of vague standard would be much more difficult to apply
than a presumptive rule such as the one proposed in this Comment. It is not
that a court cannot consider important yet nebulous values, such as harmony
between the environment and humans; rather, these should come into play
when addressing the balance-of-the-equities and the public-interest factors.240
A presumption of irreparable injury would send a signal to defendants and
courts that procedural violations of NEPA must be taken seriously.
The fourth and final reason why irreparable injury should be presumed
from a violation of NEPA’s procedures involves the crucial temporal aspect of
NEPA. That is, an EIS must be completed along the proper timeline to ensure
the agency knows all the potential environmental ramifications of its proposed
action before it decides whether to initiate that action. A procedural violation
of NEPA, even absent the likelihood of environmental harm required by the
Supreme Court, undermines this important facet of NEPA and thus should
suffice as irreparable injury.
An example helps illustrate this point. One could argue that, in Geertson,
the Court erred by vacating the injunction against any and all partial
deregulation of RRA.241 That injunction was within the Court’s discretion242
and necessary—even if a partial deregulation may result in zero environmental
harm—to ensure that APHIS’s decision upon completion of its EIS would not
be biased. It is easy for one to imagine a scenario in which a preliminary
partial deregulation could cause APHIS to decide to completely deregulate
RRA, even though its EIS revealed that significant environmental harm would
ensue from complete deregulation. For instance, as a result of partial
239
240

Taylor, supra note 218, at 139 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)).
Id. at 141 (noting how the public-interest factor operates as a “‘check’ on a finding of irreparable

harm”).
241

See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
Brief of Amici Curiae Dinah Bear et al. in Support of Respondents at 12, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (No. 09-475) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Dinah Bear et al.] (citing
Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 157 (1985)) (“A court is well within its equitable discretion
to enjoin an unprecedented activity from proceeding until after a proper environmental analysis, required by
statute, has been conducted.”). By way of comparison, Congress has explicitly stated in other statutes that a
procedural violation should not be the basis for an injunction. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1571(a)(3) (2006)
(stating that “the inadequacy or failure to prepare” the requisite written statement, describing “the effects of
Federal regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector,” “shall not be used as
a basis for staying, enjoining, invalidating or otherwise affecting such agency rule”).
242
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deregulation, farmers may begin to rely on the availability of RRA, thereby
increasing demand for the product and creating a market that APHIS later
would be tempted to expand via a complete deregulation.
Perhaps then-Circuit Judge Breyer explained this phenomenon of
“bureaucratic momentum”243 best:
[A]s time goes on, it will become ever more difficult to undo an
improper decision (a decision that, in the presence of adequate
environmental information, might have come out differently). The
relevant agencies and the relevant interest groups (suppliers, workers,
potential customers, local officials, neighborhoods) may become ever
more committed to the action initially chosen. They may become
ever more reluctant to spend the ever greater amounts of time, energy
and money that would be needed to undo the earlier action and to
embark upon a new and different course of action. . . . Given the
realities, the farther along the initially chosen path the agency has
trod, the more likely it becomes that any later effort to bring about a
new choice, simply by asking the agency administrator to read some
244
new document, will prove an exercise in futility.

This reality supports the argument that a violation of NEPA’s procedures
should create a presumption of irreparable injury. Even if a preliminary step
taken by the agency may not harm the environment, it still could bias the
agency’s decision-making process. This potential for bias should be avoided
because environmentally benign, preliminary actions frequently lead to
environmentally harmful actions.245
The CEQ’s regulations explicitly limit the actions an agency may take
while completing an EIS. An agency, prior to EIS completion, shall take no
action that would “[l]imit the choice of reasonable alternatives”246 or
“determine subsequent development.”247 Thus, in the NEPA context, an
injunction against preliminary steps is less like “an extraordinary remedy.”248

243 N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Bureaucratic rationalization and
bureaucratic momentum are real dangers, to be anticipated and avoided . . . .”).
244 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503 (1st Cir. 1989).
245 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1975) (intimating that the
environmentally harmless actions of approving and committing federal funds for airport development projects
might ultimately lead to environmentally damaging construction).
246 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(a)(2) (2011).
247 Id. § 1506.1(c)(3).
248 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128
S. Ct. 2207, 2218–19 (2008)).
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Instead, it simply requires federal agencies to do what already is required of
them under NEPA—wait until they have all the relevant information regarding
a proposed action. If this information shows that the proposed action does not
significantly threaten the environment and that a preliminary step taken by the
agency would have been environmentally benign, so be it. The point is that
NEPA’s enacting Congress thought the agency must know this information
before making a decision249 because there are many situations in which the
proposed action does pose a risk to the environment. Allowing an agency to
proceed with any sort of preliminary decision prior to completion of an EIS
directly contravenes the purpose of NEPA250 and does little to prevent agencies
from prematurely devoting time, resources, and energy to a proposed action.
Importantly, the notion that a court should invoke its equitable powers to
address a procedural violation in the absence of any substantive harm is not an
entirely novel idea and squares with the Supreme Court’s accepted
jurisprudence in other areas of the law.251 For example, in Clark v. Roemer, the
preclearance provisions in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act had been
violated, yet a district court allowed an election to go forward anyway.252 The
Supreme Court reversed without even asking whether the procedural violation
at issue had led to any sort of tangible harm.253 The procedural provisions of
NEPA warrant the same deference.
The analysis of irreparable injury proposed here—that irreparable injury be
presumed when an agency has violated NEPA’s procedures—also comports
with the traditional understanding of equitable relief. Traditionally, injury has
been considered irreparable when the plaintiff could not use monetary damages
to replace the specific thing she lost.254 The loss of the benefits resulting from
an agency’s informed decision-making process cannot be remedied with
249

See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
Brief of Amici Curiae Dinah Bear et al., supra note 242, at 20 (“The difference in timing between [the
injunction that the district court adopted and the injunction APHIS proposed] is the difference between
enforcing and not enforcing NEPA’s objectives, where the unanalyzed activity threatened environmental
injury.”).
251 Brief for Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council et al. in Support of Respondents at 33,
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (No. 09-475).
252 500 U.S. 646, 650 (1991).
253 Id. at 655, 660.
254 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 37 (1991) (noting that the
inadequacy of legal remedies “is by far the most important source of irreparable injury”); ELAINE W. SHOBEN
ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 52 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that the requirement of irreparable injury
“is usually just an alternative phrasing of the inadequacy rule; the harm is irreparable because the damage
remedy is inadequate”).
250
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damages.255 While actual environmental harm cannot be remedied by damages
either, harm to the informed decision-making process envisioned by NEPA’s
enacting Congress suffices. Because irreparable injury traditionally has been
equated with inadequacy of legal remedies, it makes sense that courts have the
power to deny a request for an injunction even when irreparable injury is
found.256 Otherwise, a court would be required to issue an injunction solely
due to the inadequacy of legal remedies, and this would lead to undesirable
results in many cases. Accordingly, courts are still able to exercise discretion
vis-à-vis the balancing-of-the-equities and public-interest factors, even when
irreparable injury is present. Therefore, absurd results will be avoided.
As argued above, Winter and Geertson should be read narrowly so as to
harmonize with the enacting Congress’s vision of NEPA and the Supreme
Court’s precedent. Specifically, these two cases should not be interpreted as
espousing the typical approach to the question of whether an injunction should
issue in a NEPA case. Rather, in the typical NEPA case, irreparable injury
should be presumed when an agency has violated the Act’s procedures. This
presumption is warranted given that NEPA’s procedures are the only way to
effectuate the Act’s purpose—informed and impartial agency decision making.
Additionally, a presumption of irreparable injury would be ideal for the
following reasons: it would (1) put environmental plaintiffs’ burden of proof at
a proper level, (2) appropriately broaden the scope of relief granted for NEPA
violations, (3) provide clarity for courts and parties alike, and most
importantly, (4) help ensure that agencies complete an EIS at the proper time.
CONCLUSION
If read expansively, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Winter and
Geertson mark the beginning of an unfortunate path toward removing the only
teeth NEPA has—its procedural mandates. By requiring a showing of likely
environmental harm to meet the irreparable-injury requirement of injunctive
relief, the Court significantly raised the burden of proof for environmental
plaintiffs. But the holdings in Winter and Geertson can, and should, be limited
to their unique facts. These cases should be read narrowly to harmonize with
255

LAYCOCK, supra note 254, at 41 (noting that a damage award cannot “replace . . . the cautionary
effects of an environmental impact statement”).
256 See SHOBEN ET AL., supra note 254, at 59, 69 (noting that “[a] judge may appropriately weigh the
relative hardships of the parties in the matter” when “deciding whether to issue an injunction at all” and that
“[t]he public interest affects the decision whether to grant an equitable remedy”); id. at 62 (“A plaintiff is not
entitled to an injunction simply upon proof that . . . the harm is great and irreparable.”).
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the enacting Congress’s vision of NEPA, as well as the Court’s precedent in
this area of the law. Specifically, Winter and Geertson should be read to
comport with Romero-Barcelo and Amoco Production Co, which suggest that
courts should consider the purpose of the statute at hand when deciding
whether to issue injunctions.
The purpose of NEPA is to ensure informed and impartial agency decision
making, and the Act’s procedures provide the only means to reach this end.
Accordingly, irreparable injury should be presumed when an agency has
violated NEPA’s procedures. A showing of likely environmental harm is
superfluous. This presumption of irreparable injury would (1) put
environmental plaintiffs’ burden of proof at a proper level, (2) appropriately
broaden the scope of relief granted for NEPA violations, (3) provide clarity for
courts and parties alike, and most importantly, (4) help ensure that agencies
complete an EIS at the proper time. Ultimately, this framework would signal to
courts the importance of judicial review as a NEPA enforcement mechanism
and force agencies to take their obligations under NEPA seriously.
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